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P.O. Box 83720
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SCOTT MAXWELL RIGGS,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 44438
Ada County Case No.
CR-FE-2016-4777

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Riggs failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing a unified sentence of 15 years, with three years fixed, upon his guilty plea to
sexual battery of a minor child 16 or 17 years of age?

Riggs Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
The state charged Riggs with two counts of sexual battery of a minor child 16 or
17 years of age (in violation of I.C. § 18-1508A(1)(a)). (R., pp.21-24, 30, 40.) Pursuant
to a plea agreement, Riggs pled guilty to one count of sexual battery of a minor child 16
or 17 years of age (in violation of I.C. § 18-1508A(1)(a)) and the state dismissed the
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second count and agreed not to file a persistent violator enhancement and to
recommend a unified sentence of 15 years, with three years fixed. (R., p.39; 7/1/16 Tr.,
p.4, Ls.15-21; p.8, Ls.5-8.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of 15 years,
with three years fixed. (R., pp.53-56.) Riggs filed a notice of appeal timely from the
judgment of conviction. (R., pp.57-59.)
Riggs asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his mental health issues,
childhood abuse, and purported remorse.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.2-5.)

The record

supports the sentence imposed.
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard
considering the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. Id.
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a sentence is
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear
abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the
facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, however, if it
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. Id.
The maximum penalty for sexual battery of a minor child 16 or 17 years of age (in
violation of I.C. § 18-1508A(1)(a)) is life in prison. I.C. § 18-1508A(4). The district court
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imposed a unified sentence of 15 years, with three years fixed, which falls well within
the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.53-56.) At sentencing, the district court articulated the
correct legal standards applicable to its decision and also set forth in detail its reasons
for imposing Riggs’ sentence. (8/16/16 Tr., p.15, L.23 – p.21, L.10.) The state submits
that Riggs has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth
in the attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript, which the state adopts as
its argument on appeal. (Appendix A.)

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Riggs’ conviction and
sentence.

DATED this 22nd day of March, 2017.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming_ _________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of March, 2017, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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perhaps -- rm assuming we give him sex offender
treatment while on a rider program - would be
sufficient assuming that he can successfully
complete that programming, and give you a peek at
how much he has matured since he was last
incarcerated. That was many, many years ago.
In terms of his sobriety, we have
talked at length about marijuana. I know that was
a concern with Dr. Jolmston just based on hi~
responses. And Scott has indicated, "Ifrm on
felony probation, rm going to comply. rm not
going to use marijuana. rm not going to use
anything."
I think at times he responds to things
without really thinking about how it is going to
be perceived and probably wasn't thinking too
clearly on how that would be received by
Dr. Johnston. But I think he is really frustrated
with himself for giving that kind of response.
But he takes the fact that he needs to maintain
his sobriety in order to stay out of trouble very,
very seriously.
And, again, I think that's something
that contributed to his behavior in this case and
the poor decision-making that occurred.
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What we're asking you to consider doing
today is to impose a two plus eight sentence, but
suspend that sentence and send him on a period of
retained jurisdiction, at a minimum just to
determine whether or not he is fit to be in the
corrununity at some point in the future.
THE COURT: All right. . Thank you,
Ms. Comstock..
Mr. Riggs, would you like to make a
statement?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. I wrote you a
letter, and I didn't have time to have it sent in
to the courts. So I'll just go ahead and read it.
THE COURT: That's fine.
THE DEFENDANT: It says: I know what I did
was wrong, and I take accountability for that. I
know it's my responsibility to pay for the
consequences ofmy poor decision-making skills. I
feel bad for what I did, and I wish I could change
it I know I cannot change what I did in the
past, but I can change the outcome of my future.
I feel that if you're kind enough and
have mercy on me and give me a chance at a rider,
that I can prove myself worthy. I do suffer from
some severe mental health issues that have plagued
Page 16
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me my entire life. I do feel these mental health
issues do affect some of my decision-making
skills. I do not feel prison would be appropriate
for me. I believe with a retained jurisdiction
and a little bit of faith, I can go a long ways.
From what I understand, I feel the
rider program can help me and prove my
decisionmaking skills.
Again, I am sorry for what I have done,
and I feel bad for it. Before making- before my
incarceration, I was making corrective steps to
change my behavior patterns. I am willing to give
up any or all substances, including marijuana, to
make successful probation.
Thank you, Judge Scott, for hearing my
write this letter. Also, I would like to add that
I wasn't on my medications when I went on my rider
the last time, and it really was a failure and a
big disappointment. I was only 21 years old. I'm
32 now, and rm a lot older and I know what I want
and I know that my freedom meanci more to me than
anything else. Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Riggs. I
appreciate your comments. rn start by saying
that I have read all the presentence investigation
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materials in the case, including the psychosexual
evaluation prepared by Dr. Johnston.
Now, in every case, rm directed to
consider the four objectives of criminal
sentencing. The first and foremost of those
factors is protecting the public. Then other
factors include rehabilitation of the defendant,
punishing the defendant appropriately for the
offense, and then finally detouring the defendant
and others who might be inclined - inclined to
commit similar offenses from actually doing so.
So these are the basic factors that I
am to consider in coming up with an outcome that
would seem to be fair under the circumstances of
the case.
Now, of course, the defendant's
background is part of what goes into that
analysis. And as counsel have noted here today,
this defendant has spent time in prison before in
COIUlection with a controlled substance possession
conviction from back in 2005. The defendant was
quite a young man at that point in time. He was
first placed onto probation in that case, but he
violated. His probation was revoked, and he was
sent on a rider.
4 (Pages 13 to 16)
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And then his rider did not go well at
all, as the parties have acknowledged here today.
And as a result, the judge relinquished
jurisdiction in that case. The defendant went to
prison. He was released on parole at some point,
but violated and was brought back into custody,
and he ultimately topped out his sentence. So
that's part of the relevant background I'm to
consider here today.
The defendant's mental health history
is also a factor that's important to consider. It
may have some mitigating effect, I suppose, from
the standpoint of it might help explain the
defendant's behavior or some of his difficulties
in life. The defendant suffered from PTSD,
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder.
He has had a number of psychiatric
hospitaliz.ations. And the presentence materials
also indicate that at times the defendant hears
voices indicating that he ought to hurt people,
and he has been able to resist those voices but
has been afflicted with that.
The defendant is a victim of child
sexual abuse himself, and of course, that also may
contribute to explaining his behavior in this
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case.
The defendant does appear to be
emotionally or mentally less than his
chronological age of32 years of age. That may
also have some tendency to explain why the
defendant was seeking out a relationship with a
teenager. So it may have some kind of mitigating
effect there, although on the flip side, it is a
concerning factor here because the defendant still
is presenting as that kind of younger person than
his criminal age may still have some tendency to
want his social circle to be persons much younger
than him and into their teenage years.
The particular incident here is, of
course, disturbing not only for the victim's age
and the defendant's - in his early thirties being
willing to engage a teenage girl in sexual
encounters, but also his behavior in the aftennath
of the encounter where the victim indicates that
when she was wanting to leave, the defendant
became very upset, yelling, spat on her.
There appears to be some uncertainty
about who told whom what as far as the defendants
and his victim's respective ages. The defendant
contends he waited until her 18th birthday,
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according to her, before they had sex. The victim
has indicated otherwise in the presentence
materials. The victim has also indicated the
defendant mislead her about his own age and
contended he was 19 rather than 31 at the time.
I don't know exactly where the truth
lies in all of that. Of course, as Ms. Comstock
noted, the defendant's belief that the defendant
was 18, assuming he did in fa.ct believe that,
isn't a defense to the charge. And certainly the
defendant ought to have known better, being in his
early thirties, than to engage teenage girls in
this way.
These sexual abuse type crimes are very
serious in my view, and a lot of the reason that
they're so serious is because they have the
potential for far-reaching, negative impacts on
the life of the victim. And one can only
speculate about how this victim might be impacted
as her life goes on by this offense, but these
impacts can be very serious, as I've said, and it
is a reason why offenses of this nature in my mind
tend to warrant pretty significant punishment.
Now, the psychosexual evaluation also
bears a bit of conunent. Dr. Jolmston detennined
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that the defendant is a high risk to re-offend
compared to other sexual offenders, that he is
less likely to comply with supervision than other
sexual offenders unless amenable to treatment than
other sexual offenders.
So that's the sort ofexpert opinion I
have been presented with in terms of the outlook
for the defendant and how well he might do on
supervision or in treatment. That's not, of
course, a confidence-inspiring assessment when I
. look at whether and when this defendant ought to
next be released into the community.
Now, there are, as rve mentioned, a
number of mitigating factors here, but the fact is
this is a serious offense. It warrants
punishment. A period ohime incarcerated is I
think an appropriate punishment for the offense.
[t's commensurate with the offense's seriousness,
and there is a need I think from a safety,
community safety standpoint for the defendant to
have in-custody treatment before he is next
released.
All things considered in my mind, the
state's recommendation here is a fair resolution
of the case, and rm going to impose sentence
5 ( Pages 17 t o 20)
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accordingly.
So, Mr. Riggs, on your plea of guilty
to the crime of sexual abuse of a minor ~e 16 or
17, I find you guilty. I will sentence you to the
custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction
under the unified sentence law of the State of
Idaho for an aggregate tenn of 15 years.
I'll specify a minimum period of
confinement of three years and a subsequent
indetenninate period of confinement of 12 years.
You'll be remanded to the custody of
the sheriff of this county to be delivered to the
proper agent of the State Board of Correction in
execution of this sentence.
You' II have credit for the time you
have spent in custody so far in this case toward
this sentence. By our count, that is 127 days in
custody. I'll assess court costs. I won't order
a fine. lt doesn't appear to me that it would be
constructive to order a fine.
The state has requested the entcy of a
no-contact order protecting the victim from
contact with Mr. Riggs, and it's certainly
appropriate. I have signed a no-contact order
here that will prohibit contact throughout the
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length of this sentence.
Marshal, I'm concerned I may have
filled out the expiration date incorrectly off the
top. Let me fix that before you serve it.
So that issue being fixed, the
no-contact order will expire l S years after the
date of sentencing. As the marshal is serving the
no-contact order on Mr. Riggs, l will note that
counsel will need to return prcsentence materials
to be sealed.
And, Mr. Rigg.s, let me just advise you
of your right to appeal before you go today. You
do have the right to appeal. Any appeal must be
filed within 42 days. You have the right to
counsel on appeal, and if you can't afford
counsel, you can ask to have counsel appointed at
public expense.
Anything else today, counsel?
MS. GUZMAN: Not from the state, Your Honor.
Thank you.
MS. COMSTOCK: No, Your Honor.
(Proceedings concluded 2:18 p.m.)
--oOo--
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I, Dianne E. Cromwell, Official Court
Reporter, County of Ada, State of Idaho, hereby
certify:
That l am the reporter who took the
proceedings had in the above-entitled action in
machine shorthand and thereafter the same was
reduced Into typewriting under my direct
supervision; and
That the foregoing transcript contains a
full, true, and accurate record of the proceedings
had in the above and foregoing cause, which was
heard at Boise, [daho.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, l have hereunto set
my hand October S, 2016.

Dianne E. Cromwell, Official Court Reporter
CSRNo.21
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